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How	Brexit	can	give	Scotland,	Wales	and	Northern
Ireland	more	policymaking	power
As	the	result	of	last	week’s	election	begins	to	sink	in,	one	thing	on	the	minds	of	politicians	in	Scotland,	Wales	and
Northern	Ireland	is	the	fate	of	devolved	authority	after	Brexit.	Anthony	M.	Bertelli	(Bocconi	and	Penn
State)	asks	how	Brexit	can	give	them	more	policymaking	power.
Prime	Minister	Boris	Johnson	endorsed	devolved	authority	during	a	September
trip	to	Scotland:	“We	are	going	to	maximise	the	power	of	the	North.	And	we
are	going	to	make	sure	that	it	is	people	here	who	are	in	control	over	the
things	that	matter	to	them.”	Michael	Russell,	Scotland’s	Secretary	for	Government	Business	and
Constitutional	Relations,	saw	things	differently.	He	claimed	that	Westminster	is	“determined”	to	roll	back	devolution
in	favour	of	a	“more	centralised	state.”
Do	the	parties	even	disagree?	Greater	Manchester	mayor	Andy	Burnham	thought	not:	“devolution	is	probably	the
only	thing	creating	consensus	across	the	political	parties.”	Local	governments	and	constituent	countries	both	want
more.
What	can	Westminster	do	to	influence	devolution?
The	so-called	Sewel	Convention	requires	any	laws	concerning	devolved	powers	to	pass	a	consent	motion	in	the
legislatures	of	Scotland,	Wales	and	Northern	Ireland.	But	Stormont	is	dormant	at	the	moment,	confusing	the	issue
for	Northern	Ireland.	Some	devolved	powers	are	now	covered	by	EU	law.	Withdrawal	would	allow	devolved
parliaments	to	choose	new	arrangements.	Still,	autonomy	comes	at	a	price.	It	might	lead	to	a	“patchwork”	of
regulations	that	differ	among	the	constituent	countries	of	the	UK.
Westminster	has	the	right	to	harmonize	policies	if	this	were	to	happen.	Back	in	2018,	then	Cabinet	Office	Minister
David	Lidington	conjured	a	light	touch:	“Westminster	would	only	be	involved	where,	to	protect	the	UK	common
market	or	to	meet	our	international	obligations,	we	needed	a	pause—I	stress	pause—to	give	the	governments	time
to	design	and	put	in	place	a	UK-wide	framework.”Michael	Russell	would	not	have	any	of	it,	claiming	that	it	“makes	a
mockery	of	claims	of	a	partnership	of	equals.
Devolution	is	about	delegation
So	what	will	happen	when	Brexit	comes?		The	picture	clarifies	when	we	think	of	the	problem	Westminster	faces	as
one	of	getting	the	authority	to	make	specific	kinds	of	policies	into	the	“right”	hands.	For	the	next	PM	(or	the	next,	or
the	next…),	doing	so	means	not	just	deciding	which	policies	to	devolve,	but	also	how	much	independence	to	give
policymakers	from	their	political	overlords.
While	some	agencies	are	under	the	direct	oversight	of	members	of	the	Cabinet,	others	are	constructed	to	do	their
work	above	the	political	fray.	They	have	fewer	consultation	or	reporting	demands,	have	fewer	statutorily	imposed
deadlines	and	their	policy	choices	are	less	subject	to	appeals	and	spending	limits.	An	agency’s	independence	and
Westminster’s	accountability	for	the	policies	it	makes	are	inversely	related.		More	independence	means	less
accountability—and	more	opportunity	to	escape	blame	when	outcomes	aren’t	what	the	government	promised.
When	Theresa	May	announced	the	closing	of	the	UK	Border	Agency	in	response	to	“historical	backlogs,”	its
functions	went	to	the	Home	Office.		She	claimed	that	the	UKBA’s	“work	at	an	arm’s	length	from	Ministers…created
a	closed,	secretive	and	defensive	culture.”	In	effect,	she	made	her	government	more	accountable	for	border
security,	but	less	able	to	blame	bureaucrats	for	bad	performance.	Giving	an	agency	independence	can	mean
outcomes	that	a	government	doesn’t	like.	But	a	key	reason	why	politicians	do	this—and,	intriguingly,	delegation	to
the	European	Commission	has	been	growing	over	time—is	to	reduce	uncertainty	about	policy	outcomes.
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That’s	true	for	two	reasons.		First,	before	delegating,	Westminster	can’t	be	completely	sure	what	policies	an	agency
prefers,	whether	that	agency	is	in	the	central	government	or	in	a	constituent	country.	Let’s	call	that	prospect
ideological	drift.	What’s	more,	Westminster	won’t	know	the	consequences	of	policies	before	they	delegate	or
devolve	them	either.		Let’s	call	this	technical	uncertainty.	Independence	can	make	ideological	drift	worse	because
when	an	agency	prefers	policies	that	don’t	square	with	those	the	Westminster	government	wants,	there	are	fewer
rules	to	stop	the	agency	from	drifting.
Independence,	though,	can	reduce	technical	uncertainty.		Freedom	of	manoeuvre	motivates	agency	personnel—
who	care	enough	about	policy	to	make	politicians	worried	about	ideological	drift	in	the	first	place—to	carefully	learn
about	policy	consequences.	The	key	tradeoff	for	Westminster	as	it	considers	devolution	is	between	ideological	drift
and	technical	uncertainty.
Image	by	Virgin	Trains	East	Coast,	Creative	Commons	Attribution	3.0	Unported	license.
How	can	the	constituent	countries	get	more	power?
My	colleagues	and	I	recently	studied	the	incentives	Westminster	will	face	when	delegating	policy	responsibility	that
returns	to	the	UK	from	EU	agencies	after	Brexit.	We	compared	a	“hard”	Brexit	in	which	the	EU	retains	no	authority
over	UK	policymaking	to	a	“soft”	alternative	where	policymaking	remains	shared	between	the	EU	and	UK.
One	important	result	of	our	analysis	reflects	the	Brexiteers’	claims	that	shaping	EU	policy	to	reflect	British	interests
is	a	difficult	business.	Devolution	to	a	constituent	country	with	structural	independence	is	more	likely	to	give
Westminster	the	policies	it	wants	than	would	an	equally	independent	EU	agency.		And	a	“hard”	Brexit	means	that
this	inferior	outcome	is	no	longer	an	option.	We	also	find	that	the	effect	an	agency’s	independence	has	on	either
drift	or	uncertainty	reduction	doesn’t	create	incentives	to	change	the	structure	of	devolved	policymaking.
In	line	with	Prime	Minister	Boris	Johnson’s	claims,	hard	Brexit	incentivizes	more	devolution.	Soft	Brexit,	with
policymaking	power,	shared	between	Westminster	and	Brussels,	is	altogether	different.	It	reduces	incentives	to
devolve	when	compared	with	both	hard	and	pre-Brexit	cases.	And	the	erosion	of	devolved	authority	gets	worse	as
the	EU	remains	more	involved	in	post-Brexit	policymaking.
What	kinds	of	policies	would	be	devolved?
Devolution	continues	to	be	important	in	technical	policy	domains.		Some	of	these	are	currently	regulated	by	the	EU,
like	flood-risk	management.	Technical	policies	should	remain	devolved—even	under	Soft	Brexit—and	remain	so
regardless	of	Britain’s	post-withdrawal	policy	influence.	But	in	any	Brexit	scenario,	hard	or	soft,	ideological	policy
areas	like	immigration	create	different	incentives.
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The	incentive	to	devolve	these	areas	depends	on	how	much	independence	stimulates	the	devolved	agent	to	reduce
uncertainty.	If	it	does	this	just	enough	to	outweigh	the	ideological	drift	independence	makes	possible,	devolution
remains	in	Westminster’s	interests.	Under	a	Soft	Brexit,	devolution	becomes	less	likely	if	Britain	is	more	involved	in
post-Brexit	decisionmaking.
Politicians,	like	the	SNP’s	Fiona	Hyslop,	might	be	well	advised	to	tone	down	claims	about	an	“overwhelmingly
strong	case	for	Scotland	to	have	the	power	to	tailor	its	own	migration	policy	to	reflect	its	own	unique
circumstances.”		The	incentives	Westminster	faces	run	precisely	in	the	opposite	direction.
When	watching	the	post-Brexit	devolution	landscape	unfold,	observers	and	commentators	should	look	to
understand	the	relationship	between	ideological	drift	and	uncertainty	reduction	the	policies	being	debated.	This
tradeoff	holds	the	key	to	the	next	government’s	incentives	regarding	devolution.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
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